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Access to facility-based obstetric and newborn care and improving skilled birth attendance at 
delivery are vital to improve maternal and neonatal health. Traditionally, underutilization of existing 
capacity, specifically the low use of facilities for maternal and newborn care services in rural areas, 
has been a critical challenge to the health system in Bangladesh. At the demand side, cost is one of 
the main determinants of low utilization of professional maternity care. On the other hand, due to 
shortage and sub-optimal performance of service providers, health facilities at the upazila level and 
below operate at less than their capacity. To improve access to and use of facility-based obstetric 
and newborn care, the Government of Bangladesh is implementing two innovative performance-
based financing programs, namely demand-side financing (DSF) and pay-for-performance (P4P).   
Both DSF and P4P schemes are designed to contribute to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) targets 4 and 5. Both programs contributed to the increase in institutional deliveries, 
yet, the country is facing challenges to expedite progress towards achieving MDG targets and to 
improve quality in health care services. DSF and P4P are implemented in parallel with their own 
merits and limitations, yet there is scope for modifications. With the purpose to identify the lessons 
learned, limitations of P4P and DSF models, and scopes for cross learning, a two-day workshop was 
organized in Dhaka. The workshop was also intended to develop recommendations for the Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) to incorporate changes into the DSF scheme or to modify 
the P4P approach for further expansion. 
DSF scheme at a glance  
DSF scheme provides financial support to poor women for receiving safe delivery services in rural 
areas. Started in 2006, currently the program is implemented in 53 upazilas. This program focuses 
primarily on Upazila Health Complexes, with referral to Maternal and Child Welfare Center or 
District Hospital.  In selected upazilas, some union-level health facilities are included in the DSF 
program. Both demand and supply sides are financially benefited through the DSF program. At the 
demand side, if deliveries are conducted at the facility or by skilled birth attendant (SBA), poor 
pregnant women receive financial assistance to receive service. At the supply side, service providers 
receive case-based incentive. Incentives are given only to providers, not to management, 
administrative and support staff. Provider performance has been linked with quantity of services 
alone. Incentives are provided monthly, calculating the total number of services provided to poor 
pregnant women.  
P4P model at a glance 
P4P project is a human resource innovation initiative – paying an incentive to the institution for 
achieving pre-determined targets. Three District Hospitals and nine Upazila Health Complexes 
tested P4P approach for 14 months. At the supply side, incentives are provided to the institution, 
where managers, direct and indirect providers related to maternal, newborn and child health 
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(MNCH) services, and administrative and support staff are entitled to receive incentive if the 
performance targets are achieved or exceeded. Within the facility, quality assurance teams (QATs) 
have been formed for different service units to monitor and review respective performance routinely 
and to coordinate the activities between team members. Quarterly targets for MNCH services are set 
for the institution as a whole, which takes into account both quantity and quality of services. 
Incentives payable to providers and staff are calculated on the basis of their level of efforts. Quality 
assurance group (QAG), consisting of specialists from nearby higher-level hospital (Medical College 
Hospital or District Hospital) and professional body, in consultation with respective facility-based 
project implementing committee, determines performance targets, performance achievements, and 
eligibility for incentive. P4P uses a systematic financial reimbursement mechanism for calculating 
and verifying incentives. Incentive payment related to performance is reimbursed by the third party. 
Meanwhile, an audit firm validates the disbursement of fund.  
Modification of DSF and P4P is necessary  
Although financial incentive in the public sector is a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, the necessity 
for introducing performance-based incentive has been justified through the positive results of both 
DSF and P4P programs. Both DSF and P4P have the same goal but they differ in approaches and 
outcomes. The key difference of these two initiatives is that P4P implemented a “quality of care”-
based incentive mechanism for MNCH care. The workshop resulted in several recommendations to 
modify DSF and P4P schemes. 
A. Suggested modifications for DSF scheme   
Incentive beneficiary  
At the supply side, along with providers working in the obstetric unit, service providers working at 
other units should be included as beneficiary. Whole institution approach should be adopted, i.e., all 
units of a facility should be brought under the umbrella of DSF. Incentives should be given to 
motivate service providers at the institution level, instead at the individual level. In other words, 
incentive should be provided to both direct and indirect providers as well as managers and 
administrative and support staff. At the demand side, DSF should target neonate and under-five 
children’s services in addition to existing services for pregnant women.  
Performance measurement system  
In DSF, only quantity (number of services provided to the voucher clients) is considered to measure 
the performance of providers. Provider performance should be linked with both quantity and quality 
of services. Inclusion of quality as a measurement indicator in DSF scheme is urgently required. 
DSF needs to introduce a systematic quality assurance mechanism to measure the performance of 
facilities on a regular basis.    
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Quality assurance system 
Quality assurance system implemented under P4P project is useful in identifying gaps in service 
delivery, and providing mentoring on a regular basis. DSF scheme can adopt the P4P experiences of 
introducing both external and internal quality assurance system. For external quality assurance 
system, DSF needs to form “quality assurance group” within each district, where faculty from 
Medical College or consultants from District Hospital will visit Upazila Health Complex with 
comprehensive emergency obstetric care and consultants from District Hospital for Upazila Health 
Complex with basic emergency obstetric care. As part of internal quality assurance system, unit-
based “quality assurance teams” can be formed to ensure coordination between team members and 
to supervise the quality within the facility.  
Incentive payment mechanism  
Performance should be measured quarterly replacing the current monthly measurement system. 
There are several problems with payment mechanism which need immediate attention: 
 Increase amount of benefits for both providers and service recipients.  
 Introduce referral fees for SBA to promote institutional delivery. 
 Provide financial benefits to SBA for performing delivery at home.  
B. Suggested modifications for P4P model  
Incentive beneficiary 
To sustain performance momentum, it is critical to establish reward system for outstanding 
performer along with the existing incentive mechanism. Field-level supervisors, e.g., assistant health 
inspector, health inspector, and family planning inspector, should be incorporated as beneficiary in 
addition to the existing fieldworkers. At the demand side, providing financial assistance to poor 
clients is strongly recommended. There should be a single, combined strategy in P4P approach – 
both demand and supply side incentives should be provided. A whole district approach, 
incorporating all Upazila Health Complexes of a district, is required for the referral system to work 
effectively.   
Performance measurement system  
At present, the family planning unit of a facility automatically becomes eligible to receive the 
incentive once the health unit achieves the performance targets. It is urgently required to introduce 
separate targets for the family planning unit.  
Services for which quantitative targets are set for the facility to receive incentive include: antenatal 
check-up, normal delivery, postnatal check-up, cesarean section delivery, and management of 
complications for newborn and under-five children. Additionally, inclusion of new indicators, e.g., 
number of deaths, eclampsia management, removal of retained placenta, management of ante- and 
post-partum hemorrhage, dilation and curettage, and post-abortion care is strongly recommended.  
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Empowering facility managers is critical so that they can reward the outstanding performer and 
adopt corrective measure for non-performers. The size of the project implementing committee (led 
by facility head) should be increased by including Consultants in Obstetrics, Pediatrics, and 
Anesthesiology of the respective facility as its members.  
Quality assurance system  
The uniqueness of P4P project lies in its quality assurance system. However, expanding the quality 
assurance system at all upazilas will be a big challenge due to limited availability of experts from 
tertiary-level hospitals. In the interim period, a QAG may be adopted for certain number of 
facilities. Alternatively, there can be quality supervision from Medical College to District Hospital 
and from District Hospital to Upazila Health Complex. Existing rate of honorarium for the QAG 
members for visiting health facilities should be increased by considering the distance and the 
opportunity cost.   
P4P pioneered in implementing internal quality supervision by forming “quality assurance teams” 
for different service units within the facility. It is a positive development since QAT meetings ensure 
coordination and cooperation among the team members. QAT meetings should be held more 
frequently, e.g., weekly meeting for QATs, as a way to sustain teamwork and ensure accountability.   
Programmatic challenges  
Although both DSF and P4P have shown promise in rapid reduction of maternal deaths, they face 
challenges of sustainability. These programs are still in trial phase and highly valued for their 
contribution towards increasing institutional delivery. Nevertheless, human resources, sustainable 
funding and delegation of authority remain as the key challenges.  
Human resources  
Incentive may be counterproductive if required human resources, training and monitoring are not in 
place. In such cases, money will not lead to willingness. Highest importance should be given to 
ensure obstetrician and anesthesiologist pair at Upazila Health Complex; otherwise it will be difficult 
for DSF and P4P programs to generate significant impact. For ensuring the availability of 
anesthesiologist alongside obstetrician, it is important to continue emergency obstetric care training, 
train more anesthesiologists, and ensure no transfer or deputation during project period, without 
having appropriate substitute. 
Alternative health care financing   
Sustainability of performance-based financing programs, which are supported by development 
partners, is a critical challenge. Performance-based financing is not an alternative approach to health 
financing, as it does not generate any revenue, rather it requires a large investment. The government 
is not capable of supporting such projects from its own resources, for which “user fees” can be 
introduced as an alternative source of financing. In such cost-sharing mechanism, poor families in 
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rural areas should not only be exempted from user fees, but also be given financial assistance in 
seeking health care.  
Resource mobilization through community involvement can also be an effective tool for sustaining a 
program. Reactivating health management committees at different tiers of health-system service 
delivery may prompt a sense of ownership among community people, if health programs are jointly 
managed by the government and local people. If DSF and P4P could reactivate health management 
committees, the community might own those programs in future.  
Delegation of authority  
Central management requires a long process to undertake recruitment and procurement for the 
health facilities in rural areas. As an interim measure, district health manager (Civil Surgeon) should 
be allowed to rearrange the workforce across Upazila Health Complexes, so that every Upazila 
Health Complex will have minimum required staff-mix. Concurrently, sub-district health manager 
(Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer) should be empowered to undertake local recruitment 
and discipline staff for improving performance of the facility. Delegating and empowering local 
managers to keep and spend the user fees that they collect rather than return them to the state 
treasury is also necessary for sustainable improvement of quality of services. 
What next 
Performance-based incentive mechanism is an innovative strategy to tackle issues related to service 
use and provider performance. Evidently, both DSF and P4P are positive developments. However, 
these are a transitional mechanism to expedite health results. In Bangladesh, the need for continuing 
performance-based financing programs to meet MDGs and other health indicators is beyond 
argument. Specifically, such encouragement is required until certain level of institutional deliveries 
and improvement in maternal and child health are attained. It is urgently required to decide in what 
capacity performance-based financing program should continue.   
Whatever the approach may be, the necessity of “quality of care” approach to improve maternal, 
newborn and child health services tested under the P4P scheme cannot be denied for the 
improvement of the monitoring of health service delivery in Bangladesh. DSF scheme can better 
perform by adopting such systematic quality assurance mechanism. It will be more useful and 
feasible if policymakers and program managers adopt results from both DSF and P4P and advance 
with a revised model, which will require less money and be more effective. The government needs to 
prepare itself to continue performance-based incentive programs in pursuance of achieving MDGs 






Access to facility-based basic and emergency obstetric and newborn care and improving skilled birth 
attendance at delivery are vital to improve maternal and neonatal health. Traditionally, 
underutilization of existing capacity, specifically the low use of facilities for maternal and newborn 
care services in rural areas, has been a critical challenge to the health system in Bangladesh. At the 
demand side, cost is one of the main determinants of low utilization of professional maternity care 
in rural areas. On the other hand, due to shortage and sub-optimal performance of service providers, 
and dysfunctional incentive environment in the health system, health facilities at the upazila level 
and below operate at less than their capacity. Considering the demand and supply side barriers to 
maternal and child health services, the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW), Government of Bangladesh (GOB) has undertaken a 
demand-side financing (DSF) program in 2006 which provides financial incentives to poor clients 
and maternal health providers. The DSF has suggested increase in institutional deliveries by around 
two and half times (Schmidt et. al. 20101). However, increased demand for services has been 
reported without addressing the quality of care, and appropriate expansion and facility improvement 
(GTZ 20082). Specifically, the quality of health care services was not addressed by the DSF 
mechanism due to an environment lacking the pre-requirements for competition. Quality assurance 
mechanisms need to be put in place in the DSF scheme (Schmidt et. al. 20101).  
On this backdrop, in 2010, DGHS has begun to implement a pilot study entitled, “Introducing a 
Pay-For-Performance (P4P) Approach to Increase Utilization of Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health Services in Bangladesh.” Performance-based incentives are awarded to a team of maternal, 
newborn and child health (MNCH) managers, providers and administrative and support staff of 12 
public-sector health facilities. Population Council provided technical assistance to the DGHS in 
implementing study. The School of Public Health of BRAC University collaborated with Population 
Council in the study. The P4P pilot project is nested within the GOB-United Nations (UN) MNCH 
and maternal and newborn health (MNH) projects. The intervention activities of the P4P project 
ended in November 2011. Due to the P4P interventions, service volume increased remarkably, 
where each District Hospital doubled the performance in institutional delivery while each Upazila 
Health Complex tripled that performance.  
Both P4P and DSF schemes are designed to contribute to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) targets 4 and 5. However, P4P is different from DSF in three important aspects. P4P 
targets neonates and under-five children’s services in addition to the services for pregnant women, 
while DSF targets only poor pregnant women. Provider incentives are calculated based on both 
                                                 
1 Schmidt, J.O., T. Ensor, A. Hossain, and S. Khan. 2010. “Voucher as demand side financing instruments for health 
care: A review of the Bangladesh maternal voucher scheme.” Health Policy, 96(2): 98-107. 
2 GTZ. 2008. “Workshop on problems and prospects of demand side financing with reference to the maternal voucher 
scheme in Bangladesh.” Workshop Report. Dhaka: GTZ.  
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quantity and quality of care in the P4P project unlike the DSF scheme, which offers incentives based 
on the number of services provided to the voucher clients. The key difference between these two 
initiatives is that P4P implemented a quality of care (QOC)-based incentive mechanism for MNCH 
care, which could have lessons for result-based financing and other health sector financial reform 
initiatives.  
In order to achieve MDGs 4 and 5, the GOB is poised to scale up the DSF scheme to 153 upazilas 
by 2015, and implement result-based financing in Bangladesh. The Health Population and Nutrition 
Sector Development Program (HPNSDP) 2011-2016 also outlines the importance of incorporating 
a “quality of care” framework; and is committed to develop a “national health care financing 
strategy” that would guide the nation in adopting more effective channeling of public resources 
towards achievement of better outcomes for the poor, women, children, disabled persons and older 
people.  
Both DSF and P4P programs contributed to the increase in institutional deliveries, yet, the country 
is facing challenges to improve quality in health care services. The lessons learned from the P4P 
pilot may assist the government to meet its commitment of offering financing options and 
employing a QOC framework for MNCH care and to incorporate changes into the DSF scheme to 
address quality of care in providing maternal health services. DSF and P4P are implemented in 
parallel with their own merits and limitations, yet there is scope for modifications. Against this 
context, DGHS, in partnership with the Health Economics Unit of MOHFW and in technical 
assistance from Population Council and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), organized a 




PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKSHOP 
The goal of the workshop was to enrich the awareness on national, regional and global experiences 
on performance-based incentives for providers and to shape the future performance-based financing 
programs to improve maternal, newborn and child health in Bangladesh. The specific objectives of 
the workshop were to:  
 Provide an understanding of the key concepts and issues regarding the performance-based 
financing frameworks in the global and regional context. 
 Discuss the performance-based financing initiatives including DSF and P4P schemes 
implemented by the Government of Bangladesh.  
 Identify the lessons learned, limitations of P4P and DSF models, and scope for cross 
learning, and discuss issues for future implementation of performance-based financing 
schemes.  
 Draft recommendations for the DSF scheme to incorporate the “quality of care” 
framework and modify its financing mechanism; recommendations for the modification of 
P4P model.  
Organization  
The workshop on “Innovative financing through pay-for-performance for providers to improve 
quality of care in Bangladesh: Transforming research into action” was held on 12-13 December 2011 
in Dhaka. This workshop was organized by DGHS, in partnership with the Health Economics Unit, 
MOHFW with technical assistance from Population Council and UNICEF, and with financial 
assistance from Australian Agency for International Aid, UK Department for International 
Development, European Union and Canadian International Development Agency through 
UNICEF.  
In the workshop, Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Secretary, MOHFW, was present as the Chief Guest. 
Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care and Line Director, Maternal, Newborn, 
Child and Adolescent Health (MNCAH), DGHS chaired the workshop. Mr. Prasanta Bhushan 
Barua, Joint Chief, Health Economics Unit, MOHFW, Dr. Mohammed Sharif, Director, Maternal 
and Child Health Services and Line Director, Maternal Child-Reproductive Health, Directorate 
General of Family Planning, and Mr. Michel Saint-Lot, Deputy Representative, UNICEF were 
special guests at this workshop.  
First day of the workshop focused on the understanding of performance-based financing 
approaches; and learning the results and lessons from the P4P pilot project. The workshop started 
with the welcome speech by Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care and Line 
Director, MNCAH, DGHS. In the technical session, national and international experiences on 
performance-based financing were shared, where four papers were presented which set stage for 
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discussion on the P4P pilot project in the broader context of health system financing in Bangladesh. 
The first presentation discussed the theory and examples on international performance-based 
financing experiences. The second one discussed the process of developing “Health Care Financing 
Strategy” in Bangladesh. The third presentation was on the DSF scheme, and the fourth centered on 
the P4P initiative. The session following the presentations was dedicated to testimonies presented by 
implementers of the P4P project.  
The second day of the workshop focused on translating the learning from DSF and P4P schemes to 
develop recommendations. The day was primarily dedicated to group work. Two groups were 
formed and given specific performance-based financing programs (DSF and P4P) to compile their 
understanding of those initiatives. In the concluding session, two groups presented their 
recommendations on the issues assigned to them. After an interactive discussion, chief guest, chair 
and distinguished speakers of the workshop provided important directions to modify DSF or P4P 
for MNCH services in Bangladesh.   
A total of 124 participants attended the first day of the workshop while in the second day 95 
participants were present. Participants were primarily from the Directorate General of Health 
Services, the Directorate General of Family Planning and the Health Economics Unit of MOHFW. 
Managers and consultants of 12 health facilities from P4P districts and 11 DSF Upazila Health 
Complexes participated at the workshop. Selected faculty from Mymensingh Medical College and 
Rangpur Medical College were also present at the workshop. In addition, representatives from 




PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING: THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
This section summarizes the presentation made by Dr. Ubaidur Rob, Country Director, Population 
Council, through which a conceptual basis of performance-based financing (PBF) was provided and 
PBF experiences of several countries were shared.   
Why performance-based financing  
Prior to discussing performance-based financing, Dr. Rob mentioned the grounds for “paying for 
results” to gain attention in global health. First, there is widespread global concern that 2015 health 
MDGs will not be met since health investments are not producing desired health outcomes, such as 
reduced maternal mortality and neonatal mortality. In many developing countries, there is long-
standing remuneration problem with concerns about quality and performance where providers are 
paid according to civil service rates. Dr. Rob referred to performance-based financing as one of the 
solutions to address the dysfunctional incentive environment in the health systems. At the institution 
level, performance-based financing is needed because it links financial investment to health results. 
At the individual level, providers are rewarded for improving the quality of work and increasing the 
quantity of services.  
Performance-based financing and its approaches  
Dr. Rob elaborated on the merits of PBF as a powerful health systems strengthening strategy in 
global health. PBF strategically uses a portion of the new resources available for health where 
payment is made not just for inputs but also for health outputs and outcomes. In other words, 
incentive (generally financial) is given to reward the attainment of positive health results. Dr. Rob 
quoted a definition of P4P as…“the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a 
measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target” (Eichler 20063). 
PBF is a new phenomenon in the health sector of developing countries. Dr. Rob provided a concise 
description of PBF approach by focusing on its key characteristics.    
 PBF uses money and other material goods to influence the actions of those who are 
delivering and receiving health services. 
 Payment is dependent on performance assessed against one or more defined measures. 
 Incentives may be at both individual and collective levels.  
                                                 
3 Eichler R. 2006. “Can Pay-for-Performance increase utilization by the poor and improve the quality of health 
services?” Discussion paper for the first meeting of the Working Group on Performance-Based Incentives. Washington, DC: 




 Incentive schemes can be developed for both supply and demand sides:  
– On the supply side, incentives tie health facility bonuses to the achievement of key 
performance targets.   
– On the demand side, households are given cash incentives to receive specific health care 
services.  
International experiences on performance-based financing 
Many developing countries are piloting or scaling up PBF programs to meet MDGs and other health 
indicators. Impressive gains have been observed in some applications of PBF across countries. Each 
country’s experience with PBF is different, but by sharing approaches and lessons learned, 
stakeholders will better understand the processes and challenges involved in PBF program design, 
implementation, and scale-up. Dr. Rob referred to several global experiences with performance-
based financial incentives that contributed to improved performance of providers. In particular, he 
provided information on the operation of performance-based financing in Rwanda, Belize, Haiti, 
Cambodia, and Afghanistan.  
Rwanda is one of the pioneers of performance-based financing. In Rwanda, poor performance of 
the health system as measured by the decline in use of key health services has prompted the 
government to introduce PBF approach in both public and private nonprofit health facilities. 
Rwanda institutionalized performance-based financing in 2005 by adopting it as a national policy. In 
this system, incentives reward both quantity and quality of curative, maternal and child health, and 
HIV/AIDS services. Payment is determined by fees for selected priority services multiplied by the 
volume delivered and adjusted by a quality score. Therefore, health facilities can raise revenues by 
increasing the quantity of specified services and by improving quality.  
With the goal to increase access, improve the quality of services, and enhance the productivity of 
health care workers, Belize is testing a supply-side P4P scheme for public and private primary health 
care clinics, which consists of monthly capitation payments plus annual performance award 
(equivalent to 10 percent of total annual earning) to the contracted clinic. Health clinics must fulfill 
monthly and annual performance indicators to earn their incentive payments. The scheme focuses 
on pre- and postnatal care and deliveries, and primary care for chronic illnesses such as diabetes, 
hypertension, and asthma. Belize’s National Health Insurance (NHI) administers the P4P scheme 
and the Ministry of Health determines policies that include defining the packages of services and 
licensing and accrediting health facilities. NHI makes the incentive payments to each clinic, while 
clinic administration distributes the payment, with the independence to spend payment for incentive 
for providers and/or for investing in infrastructure or other inputs. The program started as a pilot in 
2001 and currently covers 40 percent of the population.  
Pay-for-performance in Haiti is part of a package of interventions in a bilateral health project 
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Starting in 1999, payment to 
contracted nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) changed from simple reimbursement for 
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documented expenditures to payment conditional on targets being reached. This performance-based 
payment system pays a fixed-price subcontract plus a bonus linked to attainment of specific 
performance targets. Remarkable improvements in key health indicators have been achieved over 
the years that payment for performance has been phased in. Performance-based NGOs provide 
essential health services to about 2.7 million people. On average, performance-based NGOs in each 
contract period performed better than expenditure-based NGOs. Possible future enhancements of 
the project include introducing performance-based payments for the public sector and 
experimenting with incentives tied to both HIV and tuberculosis care.  
Cambodia introduced performance incentive contracts in three provinces in 2004 to address two 
main human resource problems in the health sector: (i) low salaries and (ii) staff reward and sanction 
system is not functional. Along with staff incentives, the contract introduced a Health Equity Fund 
(HEF) and supported training, behavior change communication (BCC) and quality improvement. 
Contracts were given to institutions not to individual staff, while institution contracted with 
individual staff. In the contracted facilities, flexible attendance (half time or full time) was allowed. 
Combined with other strategies such as HEF, training, BCC and quality improvement, the 
Performance Based Incentive Scheme contributed significantly to the motivation of the health 
personnel and hence to increased utilization of health services and coverage rates.  
In Afghanistan, the World Bank introduced a performance-based payment for NGOs. Through a 
competitive process, NGOs are contracted to provide a basic package of services to people living in 
an entire province. In this system, the winning NGOs receive a contract that pays them the budget 
they proposed plus the opportunity to earn up to an additional 10 percent if performance targets are 
reached. Overall performance is better in these World Bank provinces, leading other donors to 
consider PBF.  
While briefing on the performance-based financial initiatives in the health sector in Bangladesh, 
Dr. Rob referred to the incentive provided in three programs.  
 Family planning program, in promoting long-acting and permanent methods, provides 
incentives to providers and clients. 
 Demand-side financing program for maternal health allows incentive payment on case basis 
to providers and pregnant women.   
 Pay-for-performance program provides incentive to the institution for achieving 
predetermined performance targets of MNCH services.  
Performance-based financing has both benefits and limitations  
Dr. Rob mentioned several benefits and potential unintended effects of performance-based 
financing. He stated that performance-based financing is effective if collective model of motivation 
is emphasized rather than individual. Benefits of performance-based financing are:   
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 Motivate changes in behavior 
 Encourage staff to work in remote areas 
 Promote hard work, innovation, and results 
 Bring desired improvements in quality and performance 
 Ensure greater accountability, i.e., improve the way health facilities respond to users, and  
 Empower community or external entity to provide feedback on the quality of services.   
Potential unintended effects of pay-for-performance include:  
 More focus on aspects of clinical performance that are measured and neglect of 
unmeasured areas 
 Diminishing professional motivation as a key attribute of quality health care 
 More cost per service – rewarding providers who meet or exceed the target threshold, and  
 Misreporting, gaming or fraud.  
Performance-based financing is a short-term solution 
Dr. Rob stated that PBF is just one promising and innovative strategy to tackle issues related to 
service use and provider performance. He added that performance-based financing makes a 
significant difference in a context where salaries remain inadequate. However, he cautioned that 
performance-based schemes are neither a cure for all problems of health systems nor a substitute for 
investments in health facilities. Performance-based financing is a short-term mechanism to expedite 





PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING IN 
BANGLADESH: POLICIES AND EXPERIENCES 
To ensure equity in access to health services in rural areas, the Government of Bangladesh has 
undertaken several initiatives, which include demand-side financing for maternal health services 
(implemented in 53 upazilas) and pay-for-performance for addressing low use of facilities for 
maternal, newborn and child  health services (pilot tested in 3 districts). In addition, the MOHFW is 
developing health care financing strategy, which will incorporate the ways to mobilize sufficient 
resources and effectively manage them to serve the needs of the poor. The discussion that follows 
will highlight on these three initiatives.  
Demand-side financing scheme: Design, experiences, challenges and way 
forward 
Dr. Azizul Alim, Deputy Program Manager, DGHS, MOHFW described how demand-side 
financing (DSF) is designed, how it works and lessons from this program.  
In Bangladesh, one of the limitations of the health sector is the low use of facilities for maternal 
health services in rural areas, which is influenced primarily by demand-side barriers. One of the main 
determinants of low utilization of professional maternity care is related to cost. The government 
health facilities provide free antenatal care (ANC), delivery and postnatal care (PNC) services, but 
the cost of medicines in the case of complications is not fully covered under the current service 
delivery system. In addition, transportation cost is not covered. In order to provide financial support 
to poor women for receiving safe delivery services in rural areas, the DGHS is implementing DSF 
program for maternal health care in several upazilas of the country. The overarching goal of DSF is 
to contribute to achieve MDG 5 by reducing maternal mortality.  
DSF pilot project was launched in 2004, and became functional in two upazilas in 2006. Currently 
the program is implemented in 53 upazilas. Selection of upazilas depends on several criteria: 
availability of comprehensive emergency obstetric care facility; presence of skilled birth attendant 
program; poverty level; literacy rate; geographical location; and scope of public-private partnership. 
DSF is primarily implemented at Upazila Health Complexes, with referral to Maternal and Child 
Welfare Center or District Hospital.  In selected upazilas, some union-level health facilities are 
included in the DSF program. Financing of the program is primarily channeled through “pool fund” 
administered by the World Bank where WHO, UKAid and UNFPA are the major donors. WHO is 
providing technical assistance through upazilla-based DSF organizers and the DSF cell in DGHS.  
Poor pregnant women are the primary beneficiaries of the DSF program. The criteria used in the 




 First or second pregnancy  
 Resident in the respective upazila 
 Functionally landless i.e. owning less than 0.15 acre of land 
 Extremely low or irregular income (households earning less than Tk. 2500 per month), and  
 Lack of productive assets. 
Both demand and supply sides are financially benefited through the DSF program. At the demand 
side, poor pregnant women receive financial assistance for transportation cost to receive service 
from facility or for referral. In addition, they get Tk. 2000 for purchasing nutritious food if deliveries 
are conducted at the facility or by skilled birth attendant. Similarly, newborns of those women are 
provided a gift box costing no more than Tk. 500.  
At the supply side, service providers receive case-based incentive with a variation across public and 
private sectors. Designated providers are reimbursed upon verification of services. Public-sector 
providers are awarded 50 percent of total allocated cost against the service as incentive while the 
remaining is kept as seed fund for improving the facility, including drugs and infrastructure. On the 
other hand, private-sector providers receive 100 percent of total allocated cost.  
Services for which providers are eligible to receive incentive include: registration, blood test 
(prenatal, twice), urine test (twice), antenatal check-up (three times), safe delivery (normal delivery), 
postnatal check-up, services for complications, manual removal of placenta, dilation and curettage, 
vacuum/forceps delivery, management of eclampsia, and cesarean section.  
Amount of incentive varies according to the types of services. For example, total performance 
reward for cesarean section delivery is Tk. 6000 (US$ 83)4, where public-sector providers receive Tk. 
3000 as cash incentive, which is distributed among its 8-member team following predetermined 
benefit ratios. More precisely, surgeon gets Tk. 1100, anesthetist Tk. 600, operation assistant Tk. 
500, two senior staff nurses Tk. 500, aya Tk. 100, ward boy Tk. 100, and cleaner Tk. 100. DSF 
program cost per mother is estimated at Tk. 3956 (US$ 55), which includes both service cost and 
non-service cost. Under the payment mechanism, Upazila Heath and Family Planning Officer 
receives DSF fund directly from the Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS in a bank account and 
withdraws the cash for both provider incentive and client payment. 
Six committees have been formed at different levels to implement the DSF scheme.  
 National DSF Committee (Health Minister as Chair). 
 DSF Program Implementation Committee (Health Secretary as Chair).  
 DSF Technical Sub Committee (Director General of DGHS as Chair).  
 District Designation Body (Civil Surgeon as Chair).  
                                                 
4 1 USD= 72 Taka 
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 Upazila DSF Committee (Upazila Nirbahi Officer as Chair). 
 Union DSF Committee (Union Parishad Chairman as Chair). 
Dr. Alim noted that an economic evaluation of the DSF program was carried out in 2010. Findings 
suggest that DSF program is having positive effect on the utilization of maternal health services, as 
deliveries by skilled health personnel have significantly increased. Reduction of out-of-pocket 
expenditures is worth noting too.  
Dr. Alim mentioned several limitations of the DSF program, which had been identified through the 
evaluation. There are some operational issues to be addressed: delay of fund release; delay in 
disbursement of cash incentive and gift box; insufficient monitoring; staff mix (obstetrician and 
anesthesiologist pair); procurement; and infrastructure. Moreover, eligibility is not properly followed 
to identify poor pregnant women. There is limited involvement of non-public providers, which 
implies the need to ensure multi-sectoral collaboration between the government, NGO, private-
sector providers.  
P4P model: Context, design, experiences, challenges and way forward 
Ms. Laila Rahman, Senior Program Officer, Population Council and Dr. Riad Mahmud, Health 
Officer, UNICEF/Bangladesh jointly presented the P4P project. Dr. Mahmud discussed the context 
of introducing P4P in the health sector in Bangladesh while Ms. Rahman elaborated on its design, 
experiences, challenges and way forward.    
The context 
At the outset, Dr. Riad Mahmud provided the background for undertaking the P4P project. Dr. 
Mahmud described the current maternal, newborn and child health status in Bangladesh. He 
highlighted several supply-side challenges in the health sector, such as human resources, quality of 
care, and logistics and supplies. Despite comprehensive infrastructure, health system in Bangladesh 
faces a critical challenge on human resources. He stated that heath system was not able to provide 
quality services due to sub-optimal performance of providers, which was also compounded by the 
lack of required supplies and logistics.  
Dr. Mahmud mentioned several aspects of human resource challenges that exist in the health system 
of Bangladesh.  
 Poor working environment for providers. 
 Frequent changes at the managerial level. 
 Increased  work load  (e.g. 100-bed District Hospital run by 50-bed human resources). 
 Low remuneration and lack of performance-based incentive. 




 Working of gynecology/obstetrics consultant of Upazila Health Complex in Medical 
College Hospital under deputation. 
 Perceived lack of confidence of EmOC-trained doctors, especially for six-month training 
recipients. 
 Tenure of EmOC-trained doctors in rural Upazila Health Complexes not linked to career 
pathway (e.g. Bangladesh College of Physicians and Surgeons does not recognize it as 
training). 
Dr. Mahmud mentioned that current UNICEF activities have been directed towards improving 
maternal, newborn and child health. The government in collaboration with UNICEF and NGO 
partners has been implementing two MNCH/MNH projects in eight districts, where UNICEF 
provides technical assistance in enhancing capacity of providers and strengthening facilities, and 
BRAC/CARE increases demand for services and strengthens capacity of community-based 
providers. Dr. Mahmud mentioned that shortage of skilled human resources for delivering quality 
MNCH services is common in these project areas, which prompted the introduction of P4P for 
motivating service providers to improve the quantity as well as the quality of maternal, newborn and 
child health services in the existing MNCH and MNH projects.    
P4P project   
To begin with, Ms. Laila Rahman elaborated on the P4P model development. Ms. Rahman stated 
that upon request from UNICEF, the Council developed a model to introduce P4P for MNCH 
services in the GOB-UN’s ongoing MNCH and MNH projects. The study utilized existing 
MNCH/MNH project intervention components and introduced “pay-for-performance” model, i.e., 
paying providers a financial reward for achieving predetermined performance targets in terms of 
increased quantity as well as quality of services delivered.  
Prerequisites  
Ms. Rahman described the process of developing an implementable P4P model, which was the first 
and foremost task of P4P pilot study. To develop the P4P model, policy workshops (1 national and 
4 district level) with both national and local level program managers and service providers were 
organized. Similarly, four workshops were held with faculty from Medical Colleges, representatives 
from Obstetrical and Gynecological Society of Bangladesh (OGSB), managers from District 
Hospitals and Upazila Health Complexes and consultants from District Hospitals. Based on 
stakeholder analysis (workshop findings), a P4P model that included five guidelines was developed. 
The mechanism for implementing and monitoring P4P initiatives into the government health system 
is delineated in those guidelines.  
Ms. Rahman noted that three prerequisites were ensured before introducing P4P. The first 
prerequisite for implementing P4P approach was that health facilities remain functional with 
necessary structure, supplies and trained providers. The second prerequisite was to have an inbuilt 
‘quality assurance system’ for accrediting the facilities that provide minimum acceptable level of 
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MNCH care and ensuring routine measurement of performance. Establishing an incentive payment 
mechanism was the last condition to meet before introducing P4P into the existing MNCH/MNH 
projects.  
Research design  
Ms. Rahman briefly discussed the project objectives. She stated the long-term goal of the project as 
reducing maternal, neonatal and under-five child mortality and morbidity. The immediate objective 
of the study was to test and compare two service delivery models to increase the utilization of 
maternal and neonatal care services, and under-five children’s critical health care services from the 
facilities.    
Regarding study location, Ms. Rahman stated that the P4P project was implemented in three 
districts. She clarified that as the study was nested within existing MNCH/MNH projects, three 
districts were purposively selected for intervention. The selected districts were Jamalpur, Gaibandha 
and Kurigram. From each district, one District Hospital and three Upazila Health Complexes 
(UHCs) received the interventions. Among three intervention UHCs, one UHC with comprehensive 
emergency obstetric care and two UHCs with basic emergency obstetric care were selected. A total 
of 12 units from 3 districts were exposed to interventions. Thakurgaon, an MNH intervention 
district, was selected as the control site. The experimental groups received the program interventions 
for 14 months. 
While discussing study design, Ms. Rahman said that two strategies were tested across study sites. 
The first strategy introduced a P4P scheme for motivating service providers to improve the quantity 
as well as the quality of services and 
enabled poor pregnant women and 
mothers of newborns and under-five 
children to access services by reducing 
their out-of-pocket costs. The second 
strategy constituted a P4P scheme for 
providers only. Thus, the first strategy 
provided cash incentive for both providers 
and poor clients while the second strategy 
provided cash incentive for providers only. 
Gaibandha and Kurigram districts were 
randomly assigned to strategy 1 while 
Jamalpur district for strategy 2. 
P4P Model  
Ms. Rahman described the process to 
assess facility performance and to pay 
incentives to service providers and 
QAG for District Hospital  
Civil Surgeon: Convener 
Faculty, Gynecology/Obstetrics, Medical College 
Faculty, Anesthesiology, Medical College 
Faculty, Pediatrics, Medical College 
OGSB, District Representative  
Representative, Implementing agency  
QAG for comprehensive Upazila Health Complex 
UHFPO: Convener 
Faculty, Gynecology/Obstetrics, Medical College 
Faculty, Anesthesiology, Medical College 
Faculty, Pediatrics, Medical College 
Representative, Implementing agency  
QAG for basic Upazila Health Complex 
UHFPO: Convener 
Consultant, Gynecology/Obstetrics, District Hospital 
Consultant, Pediatrics, District Hospital 
Representative, Implementing agency 
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District Hospital P4P Committee 
Civil Surgeon: Chairperson 
Deputy Director-Family Planning: Member 
Nursing Superintendent: Member 
BRAC/CARE representative: Member 
BMA representative: Member 
RMO: Member-Secretary 
 
Upazila Health Complex P4P Committee 
UHFPO: Chairperson 
Upazila Family Planning Officer: Member 
Nursing Supervisor: Member 
BRAC/CARE representative: Member 
Upazila Parishad representative: Member 
RMO: Member-Secretary 
recipients. In particular, she highlighted the quality assurance, incentive recipients, payment rules, 
and project management.    
Establishment of quality assurance mechanism. Quality assurance groups (QAGs) were formed 
within each district, consisting of specialists from nearby Medical College Hospital or District 
Hospital and professional body, with the purpose to provide systematic visits to health facilities to 
accredit and assess. QAGs visited the facilities quarterly, graded the facilities and provided 
supportive feedback to the providers to improve maternal, newborn and child health services.  
Within the facility, the MNCH team was divided into smaller teams or sub-teams to provide specific 
services, as an internal quality assurance mechanism. Quality assurance teams (QATs) were formed 
for the following units: emergency room, labor room, operation theater, autoclave room, female 
ward, child ward or newborn care corner, pharmacy, store, laboratory, antenatal and postnatal care 
corner, and family planning corner. For each of the QATs, a leader was identified and given 
responsibility to coordinate the activities of the respective unit. QATs monitored and reviewed 
service performance fortnightly and ensured coordination between team members.  
Formation of P4P Committees. Institution-
based P4P Committees were formed to 
implement, oversee and facilitate the P4P 
project activities. The committee members 
met once a month to review the performance 
of the facility, and took appropriate measures, 
as necessary. As part of the financial 
management under P4P project, the 
committees were mandated to receive the 
incentive and the “drugs, consumables and 
maintenance” fund in the P4P Committee’s 
bank account, keep appropriate records, and 
approve of incentive distribution to the 
beneficiaries. 
Incentive recipients. Incentives were 
provided to motivate service providers at the institution level. Since the main thrust of introducing 
P4P approach was to increase institutional deliveries, direct and indirect providers related to 
pregnancy, neonatal care and under five children’s services, and management, administrative and 
support staff were eligible to receive incentive if the performance targets were achieved or exceeded.    
Performance targets. Quarterly targets for MNCH services were set for the institution as a whole, 
which took into account both quantity and quality of services. Two levels of quantitative 
performance targets based on the benchmark were set to pay incentives to a health facility. Amount 
of incentive of a facility varied according to its level of performance improvement – higher incentive 
payment for higher performance improvement. Incentives payable to providers and staff were 
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P4P: Key lessons learned 
 Facilities respond to the performance targets in terms 
of increasing quantity and quality of MNCH care.  
 Providers are motivated with P4P incentives. 
 Nurses, indirect providers and support staff perceive 
more financial benefits than doctors/consultants.  
 QAG tool empowers the QAG members to measure 
performance and provide feedback.  
 Mentoring through the QAGs is effective but does 
not replace the need for formal training.  
 Accountability of the providers can be increased 
through internal unit-based quality assurance teams.   
calculated on the basis of level of efforts; for instance managers and direct service providers received 
full incentive while indirect service providers and administrative staff received half incentive. QAG, 
in consultation with respective facility-based P4P committee, determined performance targets, 
performance achievements, and eligibility for incentive. Performance of a facility was measured 
using service statistics and QAG visit reports.  
Reimbursement mechanism. A systematic financial reimbursement mechanism was employed for 
calculating, disbursing and verifying incentives. At the end of each quarter, performance was 
measured and the level of the incentives was determined. Incentive payment related to performance 
was determined by the QAG members, and reimbursed by the project implementing agency. The 
project staff calculated the amount of incentives payable to the service providers by using the QAG 
visit report and analyzing service statistics. Service providers received money quarterly through bank 
transfer for achieving the facility-based performance targets. Meanwhile, the disbursement of fund 
was validated by an audit firm. 
Reaching poor clients. Poor pregnant women in the project areas in Gaibandha and Kurigram 
districts received financial assistance to meet costs of transportation, medicines and other incidentals 
for pregnancy and delivery related services. Newborns and under-five children of poor mothers 
received similar financial assistance too. Coupons were provided to cover transportation, medicines, 
and incidental costs relating to unforeseen expenses women, newborns, and under-five children 
incurred while staying a facility. Medicines were provided on receipt of a medicine coupon, while 
cash was provided to beneficiaries to meet transportation and incidental costs after receiving 
services. 
Findings from P4P project   
Ms. Rahman highlighted several key findings of 
the P4P pilot project. She said that the P4P 
model contributed in improving the quality of 
care while increasing the quantity of services. 
Assessment of the performance indicates that in 
93 percent of cases, facilities received incentives 
based on achieving both the quantity and quality 
targets. MNCH service volume increased 
remarkably due to the P4P interventions. For 
example, each District Hospital doubled the 
performance in institutional delivery while each 
Upazila Health Complex tripled that 
performance.  
In terms of quality, facilities that have achieved performance targets used partograph in all deliveries 
and improved the readiness of labor room, emergency room, female ward, pediatric ward, laboratory 
and store. Un-sterile and sterile areas of autoclave room were marked, with a trained person in-
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charge. The facilities also introduced antenatal care and postnatal care corner, breastfeeding corner, 
post-operative room, and washroom adjacent to labor room. In all facilities, sick newborn care unit 
was separated. Suggestion box was installed for clients to provide feedback on the improvement of 
services. 
Ms. Rahman also provided some cost information related to the provider incentive and institutional 
delivery. Average quarterly provider incentive cost per District Hospital was estimated at Tk. 
740,666 (equivalent to US$ 10,287) which was distributed among 63 staff. Direct providers received 
the majority of the incentives (67 percent) followed by support staff (12 percent). Managers got only 
eight percent of the total incentive allocated to the institution.  
Each Upazila Health Complex received Tk. 436,009 (equivalent to US$ 6,056) as provider incentive 
per quarter, which was distributed among its 44 staff. Like District Hospital, nearly similar 
distribution of incentives was observed for the Upazila Health Complexes. Of the total incentive 
allocated to the institution, direct providers received the majority of the incentives (59 percent) 
followed by support staff (18 percent) and managers (9 percent).  
Average rate of each institutional delivery stood at Tk. 4,556 (US$ 63) which varied between districts 
mainly due to staff size of facilities and number of deliveries. In Gaibandha, US$ 53 was required as 
provider incentive for each institutional delivery while it was US$ 65 and 67 for Kurigram and 
Jamalpur respectively.  
Way forward   
Ms. Rahman mentioned several challenges that were encountered during the implementation of P4P 
project. The challenges were:  
 Placement of key human resources was prerequisite, but not met. 
 Some facilities were chronically constrained by vacancy in key human resource positions. 
 Lack of training/refresher training hindered the quality improvement. 
 Inadequate utilization of the project fund limited the capacity of unit-based quality 
assurance teams to bring the desired change. 
Ms. Rahman put forward some recommendations for improving the P4P model: 
 Key human resources are to be placed and provided with training/refresher training.   
 An automated QAG tool could be more effective.  
 Health management information system needs to be automated.  
 Larger group of QAG members or an institution needs to be aligned, trained, certified and 
engaged. 
 Institutional targets based on past performance should not be used for the facilities that 
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historically performed at low level, otherwise it will increase the cost of delivery per facility.  
 It is necessary to integrate audit on service volume and client perspective with performance 
measurement.  
 Minimum quantity of institutional delivery needs to be defined in order to ensure 
sustainability.  
Ms. Rahman justified the necessity for continuing provider incentive to improve the MNCH services 
by illustrating the positive results of P4P pilot project. She concluded her presentation with the hope 
that P4P model’s “quality assurance system” could be adapted into the DSF scheme for facility 
strengthening and employing standardization in quantitative and qualitative achievements.  
Health care financing strategy: Process and progress 
Mr. Prasanta Bhushan Barua, Joint Chief, Health Economics Unit, MOHFW described the process 
of development of a “Health Care Financing Strategy”, focusing on the context, approach and 
progress. Mr. Barua was interested to learn from the workshop how performance-based financing 
can be incorporated as one of the strategies for health care financing.  
Strategic plan documents of HPNSDP 2011-16 necessitate the development of a health care 
financing strategy. Mr. Barua informed that the Government of Bangladesh recognizes that it faces a 
challenge in mobilizing sufficient resources and effectively managing them to serve the needs to the 
poor. With an increasing share of health expenditures being financed by household in the form of 
out-of-pocket payments and the prospect of declining contributions from development partners in 
future, the MOHFW made an attempt to review and reform the way in which the sector is financed. 
To begin with, the MOHFW formed a “Health Financing Resource Group” comprised of 
representatives of government, development partners, academics, and researchers, who will lead the 
process of developing the strategy. The MOHFW has adopted a systematic process to develop 
health care financing strategy. Mr. Barua discussed the steps of developing the strategy. Broadly, the 
activities are divided into five steps or stages: 
 Set goals and objectives 
 Identify and review potential strategies  
 Draft the health care financing strategy document 
 Conduct stakeholder consultations and finalize strategy document, and  
 Approval of the strategy.  
Mr. Barua shared a draft outline of the health care financing strategy. He stated the vision of the 
proposed strategy as to “…support universal coverage of health care focusing on equity, efficiency 
and resource mobilization.” The strategy document will include five broad sections:   
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 Rationale/situation analysis 
 Health care financing vision, goals and objectives 
 Health care financing strategies (with examples)  
 Implementation framework, and  
 Monitoring and evaluation framework.  
Mr. Barua informed that the MOHFW is currently at the stage to identify and review potential 
strategies. He expected to share the first draft of the strategy document within March 2012. Upon 
undertaking stakeholder consultations and revisions, final draft will be ready for approval by May 
2012. To conclude, he appreciated the timeliness and appropriateness of the workshop on 
performance-based financing, which provided a useful platform to understand the strengths, 
limitations and challenges of DSF and P4P schemes, and to identify short-term and medium-term 
strategies/recommendations for DSF and P4P as part of the health care financing policies.  
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DEFINING FUTURE PERFORMANCE-BASED 
FINANCING MODEL: FINDINGS FROM  
GROUP WORK  
The second day of the workshop was primarily dedicated to group discussion. Two groups were 
formed and assigned specific performance-based financing programs (DSF and P4P) to examine 
their status, identify issues and challenges to implement these programs, and compile understanding 
on how to address those issues.  
Each of the two groups consisted of selected group members and a pre-designated group leader and 
a facilitator. Members of the respective group selected a “presenter” for sharing the findings of 
“group work”.  Discussion of the group work centered on seven broad areas.  
 Implementation facility 
 Incentive beneficiaries (supply side and demand side) 
 Performance measurement criteria and authority 
 Quality assurance system 
 Level of payment 
 Incentive payment mechanism, and  
 Challenges. 
The group work was designed in a way that understanding of the issues and limitations of DSF and 
P4P schemes was improved and that two sets of recommendations were drafted:  
 Incorporation of the quality of care framework and modification of financing mechanism in 
DSF scheme. 
 Modification of the institution-based P4P model.  
Group work findings 
a)  Incorporation of quality of care framework and modification of financing mechanism in 
DSF scheme 
Group A discussed on the feasibility of incorporating quality of care framework and modifying 
financing mechanism of the DSF scheme. The group was consisted of 32 members. Among them 
Dr. Saleh Mohammad Rafique, former Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS was the team leader 
and Dr. S.M. Shahida, Assistant Professor, Gynecology/Obstetrics, Mymensingh Medical College 




DSF scheme is primarily implemented at Upazila Health Complexes, with referral to Maternal and 
Child Welfare Center or District Hospital.  DSF is the first attempt in the health sector that provides 
financial support to poor women for receiving safe delivery services from facilities. Supply side is 
also financially benefited through the DSF program where service providers receive incentive for 
obstetric care services. In selected upazilas, union-level health facilities are included in the DSF 
program. Group A suggested the inclusion of all union Health and Family Welfare Centers 
(HFWCs)5 of a upazila into the DSF scheme. Dr. Shahida, the presenter from Group A, identified 
non-availability of delivery services at HFWCs as a key challenge to ensure access to safe delivery 
services at the community level. HFWCs need to be strengthened to provide normal delivery 
services and to promote referral from community to upazila and district level hospitals. 
Under the DSF scheme, incentives are given to facility-based providers while field-level 
functionaries (health and family planning fieldworkers and their supervisors) are not entitled as 
beneficiary. At the demand side, DSF aims to provide financial assistance to only pregnant women 
for receiving obstetric care services. Dr. Shahida, in her presentation, urged policymakers to include 
health and family planning fieldworkers and their supervisors as beneficiary at the supply side and 
newborns at the demand side. Most importantly, whole institution approach should be adopted, i.e., 
all units of a facility should be brought under the umbrella of performance-based financing.  
Only quantity of services is considered to measure the performance of providers under the DSF 
scheme. Dr. Shahida noted that DSF offers incentives based on number of services provided to the 
voucher clients, for which non-voucher clients do not often get equal attention. She emphasized to 
have a defined performance measurement system in the DSF scheme, which should consider both 
quantity and quality of services.  
Incentives are provided monthly, calculating the total number of services provided to poor pregnant 
women, for which there is no external body to assess the performance. Dr. Shahida referred to the 
P4P project in outlining the performance measurement system for the DSF scheme. Like the P4P 
project, quality assurance group (QAG), consisting of experts from Medical College or District 
Hospital, should periodically measure the performance of a facility using a standard checklist.  
The presenter elaborated on a “quality assurance system” for the DSF scheme. Group A suggested 
to adopt the P4P experiences of introducing both external and internal quality assurance system. For 
external quality assurance system, DSF scheme can form QAGs within each district, where faculty 
from Medical College will visit Upazila Health Complex with comprehensive emergency obstetric 
care and consultants from District Hospital for Upazila Health Complex with basic emergency 
obstetric care. Like the P4P project, QAGs may make quarterly visits to facilities, measure the 
performance of facilities and provide supportive feedback to the providers to improve maternal, 
                                                 
5 HFWC is the first level fixed-facility located at the union level (the lowest administrative unit covering about 30,000 




newborn and child health services. As part of internal quality assurance system, unit-based quality 
assurance teams, same as P4P, can be formed to monitor and review performance routinely as well 
as to supervise the quality within facility.  
At present, Upazila DSF Committee, which is headed by Upazila Nirbahi Officer, has four members 
from the Upazila Health Complex and more than five non-facility members, but consultants of the 
respective facility are not included as members. For better functioning of DSF, Group A suggested 
to include Obstetrics and Anesthesiology Consultants of respective facility in the Upazila DSF 
Committee as members.   
Group A identified several problems in the payment level and reimbursement mechanism of the 
DSF scheme. Under the DSF scheme, only providers receive incentives while managers and 
administrative staff are not covered as beneficiary. Other problems with payment level which need 
immediate attention are: 
 Increase amount of benefits for both providers and service recipients. 
 Introduce referral fees for community-based skilled birth attendant (CSBA) to identify high-
risk pregnant women and to promote institutional delivery. 
 Provide financial benefits to CSBA for performing delivery at home. 
 Reduce the gap in incentive amount between surgeon and anesthesiologist.  
Regarding incentive payment mechanism, Group A suggested adopting P4P approach in providing 
incentives to the facility. Generally, Upazila Heath and Family Planning Officer receives DSF fund 
directly from the Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS in a bank account and withdraws the cash 
for both provider incentive and client payment. At the workshop, payment mechanism used in the 
P4P project was strongly recommended for the DSF program – a mixed system with bank transfer 
for provider payment and cash payment for clients. Financial management needs to be remained 
with the government. Performance should be measured quarterly replacing the current monthly 
measurement system.  
On the basis of discussions among members at the group session, the presenter pointed out several 
challenges to strengthen DSF program, which included: 
 Address shortage of human resources, especially obstetrician-anesthesiologist pair. 
 Ensure functional ambulance facility. 
 Develop infrastructure. 
 Change attitudes of service providers. 
 Modify human resource management strategy. 
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Dr. Shahida concluded the presentation on behalf of Group A by reiterating that since the DSF 
scheme focuses on the quantity of services, the quality of care approach to improve MNCH services 
tested under the P4P scheme may have the potential to enrich the DSF scheme, and the 
improvement of the monitoring of health service delivery in Bangladesh. 
b) Modification of the institution-based P4P model  
Group B presented the P4P model and the group discussion was led by Dr. A.B.M. Jahangir Alam, 
former Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS. The group was consisted of 34 members, and 
identified some operational problems of P4P pilot project and put forward suggestions for 
modifying the existing model. Dr. A.B.M. Jahangir Alam was the team leader and Dr. Md. Feroze 
Khan, Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer, Islampur Upazila Health Complex, Jamalpur 
was the presenter. Mr. Md. Noorunnabi Talukder, Program Officer, Population Council, facilitated 
the discussion.  
Dr. Md. Feroze Khan, the presenter from Group B, mentioned the absence of a unified strategy 
within the district health system since P4P approach was piloted at district and selected upazila 
hospitals. It was strongly suggested to 
adopt a whole district approach (all 
upazilas with both upazila- and union-level 
facilities) in phased manner, with 
strengthened referral from union to 
upazila to district. Inclusion of Mother 
and Child Welfare Centers (MCWCs) and 
HFWCs is another recommendation for 
modifying P4P approach. 
P4P is noted for providing incentives to motivate service providers at the institution level covering 
management, service, administrative and support staff. P4P project implemented two strategies in 
piloting the approach – one strategy tested incentives to both providers and clients while the other 
for service providers alone. Group B recommended not to implement two strategies in a single 
program, but to undertake a combined approach, i.e., providing financial assistance to poor clients 
along with rewarding service providers with incentive.  
Services for which quantitative targets are set for the facility to receive incentive include: antenatal 
check-up, normal delivery, postnatal check-up, cesarean section delivery, and management of 
complications for newborn and under-five children. But, health facilities exert tremendous efforts to 
manage several deadly complications related to 
pregnancy and delivery which are not included 
as quantitative targets. By identifying such 
inadequacy of quantitative performance 
indicators, Dr. Khan emphasized the need to 
include new indicators, e.g., eclampsia 
“District Hospital is the referral hospital, which receives clients from all 
its upazilas. More clients are coming to P4P upazila hospitals as they 
get financial assistance for referral services. Referral system will work 
better if all Upazila Health Complexes of a district receive P4P 
intervention. It should be a whole district approach.”  
– Dr. Nazrul Islam, RMO, Kurigram District Hospital  
 “We need manpower first then incentive. It is not possible to 
continue P4P program if we do not have necessary human 
resources, including doctors, nurses, ward boy, aya and cleaner. 
Developing specialists along with creating necessary post is a pre-
requisite for continuing such incentive program.”  
– Dr. Md. Shahidul Huq, Civil Surgeon, Gaibandha 
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management, removal of retained placenta, management of ante-partum and post-partum 
hemorrhage, dilation and curettage, and post-abortion care.   
The major limitation of the P4P model as identified by Group B is that family planning unit of a 
facility does not have separate targets and responsibilities. They automatically become eligible to 
receive the incentive once the health unit achieves the performance targets, which is a great source 
of de-motivation for some providers. Dr. Khan informed that the necessity to introduce separate 
targets for the family planning unit was repeatedly highlighted during the group work.   
P4P project management committee is restricted to six members of which four members are from 
the respective facility, but does not have any consultants as its members. The presenter 
recommended to increase the size of P4P committee by including Obstetrics, Pediatrics, and 
Anesthesiology Consultants of the respective facility (if any) as its members.  
As part of external quality assurance system, Group B was supportive of continuing with the existing 
system, where faculty from Medical College visit District Hospital and Upazila Health Complex with 
comprehensive emergency obstetric care and consultants from District Hospital visit Upazila Health 
Complex with basic emergency obstetric care. For implementing quality assurance system at all 
upazilas, availability of experts from tertiary level hospitals will be a challenge. In the interim period, 
a QAG may be opted for certain number of facilities. Besides, quality supervision from district to 
upazila was suggested. Group B was in favor of increasing the existing rate of honorarium of QAG 
members for visiting health facilities by considering the distance and the opportunity cost.  
P4P pioneered in implementing internal quality supervision by forming “quality assurance teams” 
for different service units within the facility. Dr. Khan commended it as a positive development 
since QAT meetings facilitate and ensure coordination and cooperation among the team members. 
Group B suggested of holding frequent meetings for QATs, e.g., weekly QAT meeting, as a way to 
sustain teamwork and ensure accountability. There should be some refreshment for QAT meeting.   
Group B illustrated that within a facility, not all providers perform equally as the eligibility of a 
facility to receive performance bonus largely depends on direct providers, particularly the obstetric 
unit. Despite weak functioning and unsatisfactory performance of other units, performance of 
obstetric unit helps the facility to get incentives. In this connection, Dr. Khan mentioned the 
recommendations emerged from the group work:  
 More incentives should be given to direct providers, particularly outstanding performers. 
 It is necessary to empower facility managers so that they can reward the outstanding 
performer, and take measure for excluding non-performer from the incentive package.   
 There should be regular coordination of services and an internal quality supervision system 




On the basis of the discussions among members at the group session, Dr. Khan pointed out several 
recommendations to strengthen P4P model: 
 Continue essential obstetric care training. 
 Continue pediatric training. 
 Create more number of anesthesiologists. 
 Empower facility managers to undertake local recruitment.   
 Provide ultrasonogram with required staff to Upazila Health Complex. 
 Ensure no transfer or deputation during project period, without appropriate substitute. 
 Revise and abridge the quality assurance checklist. 
 Orient internal service units on quality assessment indicators.  
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PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF PERFORMANCE-
BASED FINANCING: STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS 
In the discussion session, both present and former Directors of Primary Health Care, DGHS shared 
their experiences and provided insightful comments. Several experts from government and non-
government sectors provided thoughtful inputs on the subject. Finally, the Secretary of MOHFW 
provided useful directions towards implementing performance-based financing for maternal and 
newborn care services in Bangladesh.  
Establishing quality assurance system and using local resources  
Dr. Saleh Mohammad Rafique, former Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS provided two specific 
suggestions regarding DSF: establishing a quality assurance system, and allowing the facility to use 
locally generated fund.  
In Dr. Rafique’s opinion, DSF is functioning well 
and contributing to the progress in the reduction of 
maternal deaths and therefore it should continue. 
He identified the absence of a defined quality 
assurance system as one of the limitations of DSF 
scheme. In addition, DSF does not promote any 
target-based performance. Dr. Rafique commended 
the P4P approach as it provided incentive to the 
whole institution not to individual providers. To 
improve the functioning of DSF scheme, Dr. 
Rafique advised to adopt the lessons of P4P project which successfully implemented both target-
based performance and systematic quality assurance mechanism.  
Incentive improves the provider performance and the quality of health services, but it is not a 
permanent mechanism. Dr. Rafique wanted to know how long such boost mechanism would 
continue. The most pressing challenge for future of DSF will be securing sustainable financing. Dr. 
Rafique urged the policymakers to devise strategies of how to sustain the DSF program once the 
donor assistance is withdrawn. 
Dr. Rafique strongly advocated for introducing “user fees” in all Upazila Health Complexes in an 
attempt to use private funds to address resource gap, i.e., to supplement government budgetary 
resources. He, however, noted that in a limited scale, Upazila Health Complexes started to charge 
user fees for selected services, like admission fee, pathological fee and ambulance charge. 
Nevertheless, centralized financial control has undermined the effectiveness of user fee. Local 
hospitals should be allowed to keep the user fees that they collect rather than return them to the 
state treasury. The benefits of such arrangement will be manifold: hospitals can re-invest the fund in 
its smooth functioning, emergency repair and maintenance, purchasing fuel for ambulance, 
“It may not be feasible to form quality assurance group 
with the experts from medical college hospital for monitoring 
all upazilas. It is necessary to know how many experts are 
available for periodic supervision of Upazila Heath 
Complexes. One quality assurance group may visit multiple 
facilities. Alternatively, there can be quality supervision 
form Medical College to District Hospital and from 
District Hospital to Upazila Heath Complex.”  
– Dr. A.K.M. Sadiqul Azam, Assistant Professor, 
Mymensingh Medical College 
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procuring essential equipment, drugs and other medical supplies (if needed), and subsidizing or 
exempting fees for poor patients. Dr. Rafique called for immediate attention of policymakers 
towards empowering the local managers to retain user fees for sustainable improvement of quality of 
services.  
Implementing a modified program   
Dr. A.B.M. Jahangir Alam, former Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS attached greater 
importance to demand-side financing along with providing incentive to the institution. He urged 
policymakers to adopt good practices of both P4P and DSF programs.  
Dr. Alam expressed his concerns on the persistent underutilization of health facilities in rural areas. 
Health-system service delivery in rural areas of Bangladesh faces several challenges on both demand 
and supply side. To increase the use of facilities, it is necessary to address four issues: poor people’s 
inability or lack of affordability for defraying the cost of transportation and medicine; lack of 
awareness on the availability of free services at government hospitals; geographical access in hard-to-
reach areas; and attitude of providers or lack of motivation among providers. In this connection, Dr. 
Alam cited examples of DSF scheme in overcoming those barriers to increase the use of facilities.  
On the other hand, several features of the P4P approach attracted Dr. Alam’s attention.  
 Dr. Alam admired the design of P4P in providing incentive to both direct and indirect 
providers as well as management, administrative and support staff. In P4P, incentives are 
given to motivate service providers at 
the institution level, instead at the 
individual level as practiced in DSF.  
 There is a missed opportunity for the 
DSF scheme that providers working at 
the obstetric unit receive the incentive 
while service providers working at other 
units are not included as beneficiary. 
Dr. Alam advised to adopt the P4P’s 
team approach in covering the whole 
institute.  
 At the demand side, DSF targets the poor pregnant women. Dr. Alam shared P4P example 
where neonate and under-five children’s services are targeted in addition to the services for 
pregnant women, which can be utilized for the DSF scheme.  
 In DSF, provider incentive is given on the basis of individual performance (quantity). Dr. 
Alam suggested the inclusion of quality as a measurement indicator in the DSF scheme.  
“Under P4P project, both teamwork and rearrangement of 
available staff within the facility have been successfully adopted 
toward achieving performance targets, but not contributing to skills 
development. For instance, in a District Hospital, nurses have to 
work at different units by rotation, which leaves them with little 
opportunity to acquire specific skills. If nurses, ward boys and 
ayas are placed in a unit for long time, they will improve their 
skills while working under a fixed team.”  
– Dr. Md. Tazul Islam, Junior Consultant (Pediatrics), 
Jamalpur District Hospital 
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Dr. Alam was skeptic about introducing user fees as he considered poverty a key obstacle to 
mainstream such initiative. Poor families in rural areas should be given financial assistance in seeking 
health care. 
P4P project implemented two strategies in piloting the approach – one strategy tested incentives to 
both providers and clients while the other for service providers alone. Dr. Alam noted that the 
exclusion of demand-side financing in one of the P4P districts is a barrier for poor clients to seek 
services from facilities. He strongly recommended providing financial assistance to poor clients. 
There should be a combined strategy in P4P project – incentive to both providers and poor clients. 
Dr. Alam concluded by stating that the government can adopt the good practices of both DSF and 
P4P programs and implement a modified program, not two nearly similar parallel programs.  
Views of experts   
Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Nath, former Advisor to the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh, was 
impressed with the speedy success of P4P study, which was reflected in the remarkable increase of 
the use of facilities for MNCH services. Due to the incentive system, providers are committed to 
work round-the-clock. Mr. Nath, however, questioned the sustainability of the program if cash 
rewards are withdrawn from the system. Even worse, the government does not have the ability to 
continue such cash incentive with its limited resources. As providers have developed the habit of 
getting cash incentives for their performance, it will be difficult to keep their performance continue 
once such benefits are withdrawn. Mr. Nath advised to find effective ways to reward better 
performers.   
Mr. Nath proposed insurance mechanism as an alternative health financing system and advised 
Health Economics Unit of MOHFW to incorporate it in the health care financing strategy. 
Additionally, Health Economics Unit should attach appropriate attention to the sustainability of 
performance-based financing programs while developing the strategy.  
Dr. Jahiruddin Ahmed, former Director, Maternal and Child Health, DGFP was not supportive of 
the idea to provide cash incentive for carrying out regular job responsibilities. He opined that 
providing incentive along with salary is a discriminative measure and such incentive is not at all 
sustainable. Nevertheless, Dr. Ahmed was in favor of running such program only in disadvantaged 
or hard-to-reach areas. He advised program managers to be farsighted in spending the resources 
available for the health sector. More emphasis should be given to improve the management capacity 
with systematic supervision and monitoring. Dr. Ahmed identified some risks associated with P4P 
initiative.  
 Incentive may be counterproductive if required manpower, logistics and training are not in 
place. In such cases, money will not lead to willingness, rather morality may be waned.  
 If P4P is implemented in certain upazilas of a district, other upazilas will not work what 
they are supposed to work. P4P can be systematically introduced throughout the whole 
district if there is enough money.  
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Dr. Barkat-E-Khuda, Professor of Economics, University of Dhaka centered his discussion on some 
managerial issues. Professor Khuda was agreed with the practice of introducing incentive at the 
initial stage of a targeted health, population and nutrition program or for covering hard-to-reach 
populations. He opined that when a program is matured or relatively matured, such incentive should 
not be continued because it is not sustainable. He advised to consider three issues prior to 
implementing a program – access, quality and sustainability.  
Professor Khuda identified a gap in the 
P4P program, as there is no system of 
punishment for poor performers. He 
was not convinced with the idea of only 
rewarding better performers. For any 
incentive-based financing program, 
there should be two sides – better performers need to be rewarded and poor performers should be 
punished. Professor Khuda strongly recommended disincentives along with incentives. 
Mr. Yann Derriennic, Principal Associate, Health Systems and Financing, Abt. Association/Health 
Systems 20/20, was encouraged by the positive results of both DSF and P4P experiences, but he 
was concerned with the transitory life of these effective programs. Mr. Derriennic urged the 
government to have a policy on the continuation of performance-based financing programs because 
such encouragement is required until certain level of institutional deliveries is reached. He opined 
that incentive should not only be for number of deliveries conducted, but improvement in quality 
also be reckoned for rewarding incentive.   
In Mr. Derriennic’s opinion, it will be more realistic if there are facility-specific performance targets 
to receive incentive payment. It should be 
local-level managers and their supervisors who 
will set the target, not necessarily the central 
management. Incentive programs will be 
benefited if such local-level target setting 
approach is employed, leaving aside the 
uneven competition between facilities.  
Mr. Derriennic was optimistic of introducing 
quality assurance in DSF. But, scaling up from 
9 to 53 upazilas will be extremely challenging, because of the constraints of human resources.  
Performance-based financing can have positive results, but such programs should not continue 
forever, rather it should continue for reaching certain targets within a specific time and providing 
sufficient evidence to come up with long-term solution. Mr. Derriennic called for the attention of 
policymakers and program managers to adopt results from both DSF and P4P and advance with a 
revised model, which will require less money.  
“Both district and upazila managers should be empowered. Central 
management requires a long process to make posting at the Upazila 
Health Complex. Civil Surgeon needs to rearrange the workforce 
across Upazila Health Complexes, so that every Upazila Health 
Complex will have minimum required staff-mix. Upazila Health 
and Family Planning Officer should be empowered to undertake 
local recruitment and take corrective measure for non-performers.”  
– Dr. Md. Feroze Khan, UHFPO, Islampur UHC, 
Jamalpur  
“Incentive is not a salary supplement rather it is used as a strategy to 
motivate providers for enhancing their performance. Incentive works to 
promote teamwork and reward providers for achieving specific targets, not to 
punish non-performers neither to accuse.”  
– Mr. A.K.M. Zafar Ullah Khan, Advisor, Population Council   
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Speeches of special guests  
Reforming the performance-based financing model for quality MNCH services  
Mr. Michel Saint-Lot, Deputy Representative, UNICEF appreciated the appropriateness of 
performance-based financing workshop in the context of the government’s commitment of ensuring 
quality health services to mothers and children. Bangladesh made an impressive progress in reducing 
child mortality and saving mother’s life, however, the country is still facing challenges to meet its 
MDG commitment and to improve quality in health care services. Being optimistic, Mr. Saint-Lot 
referred to the effectiveness of P4P and DSF programs in addressing maternal, neonatal and child 
mortality and morbidity as well as ensuring human rights to health and to live.  
Mr. Saint-Lot highlighted several systemic achievements of the P4P project, which has increased the 
use of maternal, newborn and child health care through providing performance-based incentives to 
service providers and subsidized coupon to poor women, newborn and under-5 children. P4P 
project has achieved its first target by developing human resources model to improve MNCH 
services of a facility. Quality of care was the heart of the program, which is not currently addressed 
in the DSF scheme.  
No doubt, DSF and P4P are two innovative approaches to find a way to reduce maternal mortality, 
but they are laden with a risk of sustainability. It is important to know how long such trial should 
continue, but certainly for a short period. Mr. Saint-Lot emphasized the need for cooperation 
between the government and development partners to find solutions towards the sustainability of 
performance-based financing programs, to keep up the momentum generated through those 
programs, and to identify strategies of where to implement such program.  
Mr. Saint-Lot looked ahead for revised performance-based financing models, which will improve 
both quality and quantity of MNCH services especially among the poor in Bangladesh.  
Synchronizing maternal and child health services of health and family planning  
Dr. Mohammed Sharif, Director, Maternal and Child Health, DGFP stated that incentive attached 
to the acceptance of permanent and long-acting family planning methods contributed to the success 
of family planning program in 1980s. Dr. Sharif appreciated the recent initiative of health sector in 
introducing performance incentives for MNCH services. He, however, underlined the necessity of 
performance-based financial incentive for the broader health system, for which functional 
coordination of services at the field level between health and family panning directorates is a 
prerequisite.  
Dr. Sharif noted that incentive brings positive outcomes even in the shortage of providers. At the 
upazila level, approximately half of the doctors against sanctioned posts are available in position in 
the family planning service delivery. Most of these medical officers are providing services in more 
than one upazila, prompted by an increase in provider incentive.  
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Dr. Sharif expressed his interest to work with the health unit despite separate process of 
accountability for health and family planning directorates. It is necessary to synchronize maternal 
and child health activities of both health and family planning units so that there will be coordination 
within whole health system at the district level and below. Dr. Sharif stressed for a concerted action 
to make the P4P initiative successful.     
Journey towards sustainable financing  
Mr. Prasanta Bhushan Barua, Joint Chief, Health Economics Unit, MOHFW centered his discussion 
on identifying alternative health care financing mechanism. Mr. Barua also made a comparison 
between DSF and P4P programs implemented by the Government of Bangladesh. Both the 
programs have the same goal of achieving MDG of reducing maternal mortality, but differ in 
approaches.  
Regarding duration of programs, DSF has been functioning for the last five years while P4P was 
tested for only one year. Mr. Barua noted that under the purview of DSF only poor pregnant 
women are covered. The good thing about the P4P project is that it covers services for neonates and 
under-five children along with pregnant women. Providing incentives to service providers and 
management, administrative and support staff based on their level of efforts contributed to ensure 
teamwork as a way to improve outcomes, which is another unique characteristic of the P4P 
approach. DSF does not link provider performance with quality of service, where the quality issues 
remain unaddressed. Mr. Barua appreciated the quality assurance system implemented under P4P 
project.  
Mr. Barua justified the need to implement alternative health care financing mechanism. In his 
opinion, performance-based financing is not an alternative approach to health financing, as it does 
not generate any revenue rather it requires a large investment. Mr. Barua underlined the necessity to 
introduce “user fee” at the government facilities. He referred to the successful experiment on user 
fee being implemented in Hyderabad, India where local managers are allowed to retain and use the 
fund generated through user fee. Seventy percent of this locally generated fund is used for 
strengthening the facility while the remaining amount is given as incentive to providers. Mr. Barua 
proposed “health insurance” as another approach on alternative health care financing. 
Resource mobilization through community involvement can be an effective tool for sustaining a 
program. Mr. Barua expressed his concerns with the inactivity of health management committees 
from community to higher level despite the government having specific order for forming 
committees at different tiers of health-system service delivery. He was optimistic that if DSF and 
P4P could reactivate those committees, the community might own those programs in future.  
Mr. Barua was hopeful that a revised P4P model would be implemented in a broader scale. 
Whatever is attempted, sustainable financing remains the key challenge.  
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Speech of the chair 
Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS began his speech by justifying the 
necessity of two incentive-based programs. Dr. Haque described the context for starting such 
incentive programs. Generally, poor people are denied access to social services, including health 
care. At the demand side, inadequate perception of women on the necessity for institutional delivery, 
lack of awareness on the availability of free maternal health services at government hospitals and 
geographical barriers contribute to the low use of facilities for delivery care. At the supply side, there 
is the problem of absenteeism, and poor accountability of service providers. The government’s 
inability to retain trained providers in rural areas is also apparent. 
Started in 2006, DSF is the first attempt in the health sector that ensures affordable access to facility-
based maternal health services among poor pregnant women. A major limitation of DSF scheme is 
that individual providers are entitled to receive incentive while P4P provides incentive to the whole 
institution, covering both direct and indirect providers as well as managers, administrative and 
support staff. Dr. Haque called for the reform of DSF and adopting the good practices from P4P 
model.  
Started in 2010, the key focus of P4P project is to improve provider performance and enhance the 
quality of services of the institution as a whole. Dr. Haque noted that P4P was successful in most of 
the facilities while in a few facilities the program was not successful. He emphasized to identify the 
gaps in service delivery within the system, which should be met, but program should not be stopped. 
Dr. Haque suggested adopting DSF lessons for P4P in increasing community awareness and 
simultaneously reaching mothers through facilities located at the community level. Like DSF, P4P 
should be reformed for its future continuation.  
There are two concerns in the P4P, which require attention: to incorporate a mechanism for 
measuring individual performance, and to consider the overall performance of a facility in case of 
non-performance of certain providers so that the facility might not be deprived from receiving 
incentives. Dr. Haque emphasized on the effective leadership of managers, where they will be 
responsible for the performance of respective facility. If necessary, training should be in place for 
managers to enhance their leadership and managerial skills.   
Along with performance reward, Dr. Haque felt the necessity to introduce disincentive for 
negligence and absenteeism of service providers or for poaching patients to private clinics. He was 
not supportive of universal roll-out of performance-based incentives. Instead, incentive should be 
given to providers if they work beyond duty hour. Dr. Haque emphasized to identify a mechanism 
of where or in what capacity performance-based financing is needed. Whatever the mechanism, 
availability of providers is the key challenge.  
Dr. Haque concluded his speech with optimism that recommendations of the workshop would 
shape policy development for performance-based financing in the health sector of Bangladesh.    
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Speech of the chief guest  
Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Secretary, MOHFW began his speech by emphasizing the importance to 
implement innovative approaches for improving the service delivery and thereby increasing 
utilization of services from health facilities towards reducing maternal and neonatal deaths, but he 
underlined the need to carry out independent evaluation of such programs prior to mainstreaming 
their good practices. The Secretary stated that such programs should not continue for an indefinite 
time. It is necessary to decide which program to continue and in what capacity.   
The Secretary highlighted some achievements of both DSF and P4P programs. Incentive linked to 
the performance of an institution practiced in P4P was more appealing to the Secretary than the 
case-based incentive to direct providers as practiced in DSF. He emphasized modification of DSF 
program, in case of further expansion.    
Shortage of human resources is a long-standing challenge to the health system in Bangladesh. If 
obstetrician-anesthesiologist pair is not ensured at upazila hospital, DSF and P4P programs will not 
be able to generate significant impact. The Secretary strongly felt the need to rationalize the posting 
of specialized doctors (obstetrician and anesthesiologist) towards achieving MDG 5.   
The Secretary expressed his interest in continuing incentive-based programs like DSF or P4P as he 
reasoned that these programs are still in trial phase and valued for their contribution towards 
increasing institutional delivery. He particularly emphasized to continue with DSF and suggested for 
an evaluation of P4P program. But, he questioned the sustainability of such donor-supported 
performance-based financing programs. The government is not capable of supporting those projects 
from its own resources, for which the Secretary felt the need to seek alternative source of financing.  
User fee has the potential to increase resources in the health sector. The Secretary, however, 
expressed his concerns with the centralized financial control. The Ministry of Finance manages the 
money that is collected from the clients in exchange of services. It is necessary to find a mechanism, 
which would be acceptable to both the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and the Ministry of 
Finance. It is only seven percent of national budget allocated to the health sector, which is grossly 
inadequate for its proper functioning. The Secretary suggested that public-sector allocations to 
health need to be increased with due recognition to performance.  
In the process of preparing a health financing strategy, it is necessary to consult with concerned 
government agencies to reach a consensus for using local resources. The Secretary recommended 
incorporating “community participation” as a strategy to generate resources in health financing 
strategy. He cited the community contribution in establishing Community Clinics, particularly in 
donating land and mobilizing fund.  
The Secretary thanked Population Council for organizing such a technical and timely workshop 
aimed at shaping the future performance-based financing programs to improve maternal, newborn 




To improve access to facility-based obstetric and newborn care, the Government of Bangladesh is 
implementing two innovative performance-based financing programs, namely DSF and P4P. Both 
the programs contributed to the increase in institutional deliveries. Despite financial incentive in the 
public sector a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, the necessity for introducing performance-based 
incentive has been justified through the positive results of both DSF and P4P programs. 
Nevertheless, the most pressing challenge for future of performance-based incentive will be securing 
sustainable financing. Both DSF and P4P are positive developments, for which the government 
needs to prepare itself by taking adequate measures in resource mobilization. In addition, it is 
necessary to draft ways to incorporate changes into the DSF scheme or to modify P4P for further 
expansion. The following discussion highlights the modifications suggested at the workshop for the 
DSF and P4P programs.   
Modification of DSF scheme  
DSF is the first attempt in the health sector of Bangladesh that provides financial support to poor 
women for receiving safe delivery services from facilities in rural areas. Supply side is also financially 
benefited through this program. Service providers receive case-based incentive, which is provided 
monthly, calculating the total number of services provided to poor pregnant women. The key 
recommendations from the workshop to strengthen the DSF program are:  
Incentive beneficiary 
 Incentives should be given to motivate service providers at the institution level, instead at 
the individual level as currently practiced in DSF. In other word, incentive should be 
provided to both direct and indirect providers as well as management, administrative and 
support staff of a facility.  
 At the supply side, there is a missed opportunity for the DSF scheme that providers 
working in the obstetric unit receive the incentive while service providers working at other 
units are not included as beneficiary. Whole institution approach can be implemented, i.e., 
all units of a facility should be brought under the umbrella of DSF. P4P’s team approach 
can be adopted in covering the whole institution.   
 At the demand side, DSF aims to provide financial assistance to only pregnant women for 
receiving obstetric care services. DSF should also target neonate and under-five children’s 
services in addition to the services for pregnant women.  
Performance measurement criteria  
 Only quantity (number of services provided to the voucher clients) is considered to measure 
the performance of providers in the DSF scheme. Inclusion of quality as a measurement 
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indicator is required urgently. Provider performance should be linked with both quantity 
and quality of services.     
 Performance should be measured quarterly replacing the current monthly measurement 
system.  
Performance measurement system  
 DSF needs to introduce a systematic quality assurance mechanism to measure the 
performance of facility on a regular basis. Additionally, such system will provide an 
opportunity to impart supportive feedback to the providers for improving services.  
Quality assurance system 
Quality assurance system implemented under P4P project is useful in identifying gaps in service 
delivery and providing mentoring on a regular basis. DSF scheme can adopt the P4P experiences of 
introducing both external and internal quality assurance system.  
 For external quality assurance system, DSF needs to form quality assurance groups (QAGs) 
within each district, where faculty from Medical College or consultants from District 
Hospital may visit Upazila Health Complex with comprehensive emergency obstetric care 
and consultants from District Hospital for Upazila Health Complex with basic emergency 
obstetric care.  
 As part of internal quality assurance system, within the facility, unit-based quality assurance 
teams (QATs) can be formed to monitor and review performance routinely and ensure 
coordination between team members.  
Payment mechanism   
Under the DSF scheme, only providers receive incentives while managers and administrative staff 
are not covered as beneficiary. Other problems with payment mechanism which need immediate 
attention include: 
 Increase amount of benefits for both providers and service recipients.  
 Introduce referral fees for skilled birth attendant to promote institutional delivery. 
 Provide financial benefits to skilled birth attendant for performing delivery at home.  






Modification of P4P model  
P4P project is a human resource innovation project – paying an incentive to the institution for 
achieving pre-determined targets. Incentives are provided to motivate service providers at the 
institution level, which in turn improves provider availability. Providing incentives to management, 
service, administrative and support staff based on their level of efforts contributed to ensure 
teamwork as a way to improve outcomes, which is a unique characteristic of the P4P approach. P4P 
approach contributed in improving the quality of care while increasing the quantity of services. P4P 
is an effective approach as provider performance has been linked with both quantity and quality of 
services. However, the workshop resulted in several recommendations for future expansion of the 
P4P approach.  
Implementation facility 
P4P was implemented at selected Upazila Health Complexes and District Hospitals, leaving an 
opportunity to incorporate other facilities under the district health system for future expansion. 
Regarding implementation facility, two specific suggestions were made.    
 Mother and Child Welfare Centers and union Health and Family Welfare Centers should be 
included. 
 A whole district approach (all upazilas with both uapzila- and union-level facilities) should 
be followed in phased manner. 
 Incentive beneficiary 
 Not all units perform equally. The eligibility of a facility to receive performance bonuses 
largely depends on the obstetric unit. Despite weak functioning and unsatisfactory 
performance of other units, performance of obstetric unit helps the facility to get 
incentives. Non-performers should not be automatically provided incentive.   
 At present, both government and non-government fieldworkers are included as beneficiary 
for referral services but their supervisors (e.g., assistant health inspector, health inspector 
and family planning inspector) are not entitled as beneficiary. It is necessary to incorporate 
them as beneficiary at the supply side.  
 Providing financial assistance to poor clients is strongly recommended. There should be an 
integrated strategy in P4P project – both demand and supply side incentives should be 
provided.   
Performance measurement criteria  
 Family planning unit of a facility does not have separate targets and responsibilities. They 
automatically become eligible to receive the incentive once the health unit achieves the 
performance targets. It is urgently required to introduce separate targets for the family 
planning unit.  
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 Health unit of a facility manages several deadly complications related to pregnancy and 
delivery which are not included as quantitative targets. It is necessary to include new 
indicators, e.g., number of death, eclampsia management, removal of retained placenta, 
management of ante-partum and post-partum hemorrhage, dilation and curettage, and post 
abortion care.  
 To sustain performance momentum, it is critical to establish a reward system for 
outstanding performer along with the existing incentive mechanism. 
Performance measurement authority  
 P4P project management committee is composed of six members, with four members from 
the respective facility, but not having any consultants as its members. These committees 
should include Obstetrics, Pediatrics, and Anesthesiology Consultants (if any) of the 
respective facility as its members.  
 Empowering facility managers is critical so that they can reward the outstanding performer, 
undertake local recruitment, and adopt corrective measure for non-performers.  
Quality assurance system 
The uniqueness of P4P project lies in its quality assurance system. Yet, there is scope for improving 
the system for future expansion.  
 Quality assurance checklist should be abridged and automated.  
 Expanding the quality assurance system at all upazilas will be a big challenge due to limited 
availability of experts from tertiary level hospitals. In the interim period, a QAG may be 
opted for certain number of facilities. Alternatively, there might be supervision from 
medical college to district hospital and from district hospital to upazila hospital.  
 Existing rate of honorarium for the QAG members for visiting health facilities should be 
increased by considering the distance and the opportunity cost.  
Programmatic challenges  
Both DSF and P4P have shown promises in rapid reduction of maternal deaths, but they are laden 
with a risk of sustainability. These programs are still in trial phase and valued for their contribution 
towards increasing institutional delivery. Nevertheless, human resources, sustainable funding and 
delegation of authority remain as the key challenges.  
Human resources  
Incentive may be counterproductive if required manpower, training and monitoring are not in place. 
In such cases, money will not lead to willingness, rather morality may be waned. The most critical 
challenge to sustain the performance-based financing programs for maternal, newborn and child 
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health services in Bangladesh is the shortage of human resources, especially obstetrician and 
anesthesiologist pair. Highest importance should be given to ensure obstetrician and anesthesiologist 
pair at the upazila hospital; otherwise, DSF and P4P programs will not be able to generate significant 
impact. Rationalizing the posting of specialized doctors towards achieving MDG 5 is urgently 
required, i.e., to ensure the availability of anesthesiologist alongside an obstetrician, for which several 
strategies are important:   
 Continue essential obstetric care training. 
 Create more number of anesthesiologists. 
 Ensure no transfer or deputation during project period, without having appropriate 
substitute. 
There is no system of disincentive for poor performers in both DSF and P4P programs. For any 
incentive-based financing program, there should be two sides, one is reward and the other is 
punishment. It will be difficult to keep the better performers’ commitment if there is no system of 
disincentive for negligence, non-cooperation and absenteeism of service providers or for diverting 
patients to private clinics. While better performers should be rewarded, poor performers need to be 
excluded from the incentive package.  
Alternative health care financing   
Sustainability of performance-based financing programs, which are now supported by development 
partners, is a critical challenge. Performance-based financing is not an alternative approach to health 
financing, as it does not generate any revenue rather it requires a large investment. The government 
is not capable of supporting such projects from its own resources, for which “user fee” can be 
introduced as an alternative source of financing. Although user fee has the potential to increase 
resources in the health sector, it has a great risk – poverty remains as the key obstacle to mainstream 
such initiative. In such cost-sharing mechanism, poor families in rural areas should not only be 
exempted from user fees, but also be given financial assistance in seeking health care. 
Resource mobilization through community involvement can also be an effective tool for sustaining a 
program. Reactivating health management committees at different tiers of health-system service 
delivery may prompt a sense of ownership among community people, if programs are jointly 
managed by the government and local people. If DSF and P4P could reactivate health management 
committees, the community might own those programs in future.  
At present, about seven percent of national budget is allocated to the health sector, which is grossly 
inadequate for its proper functioning. Public-sector allocations to health need to be increased with 
due recognition to performance.  
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Delegation of authority  
Central management requires a long process to make any recruitment and procurement for the 
health facilities in rural areas. It is necessary to grant greater managerial and financial autonomy to 
District Hospitals and Upazila Health Complexes. As an interim measure, Civil Surgeon should be 
allowed to rearrange the workforce across Upazila Health Complexes, so that every Upazila Health 
Complex will have minimum required staff-mix. Concurrently, Upazila Health and Family Planning 
Officer should be empowered to undertake local recruitment and to discipline staff. Specifically, 
they should have full autonomy in the recruitment of several groups of workers, particularly support 
staff.  
Centralized financial control undermines the effectiveness of cost recovery. The Ministry of Finance 
manages the money that is collected from the clients in exchange of services. Until recently, the 
revenues generated from user fees are returned to the state treasury, with barely any impact upon the 
quality of health care of facilities. Local hospitals should be allowed to keep and spend the user fees 
that they collect rather than return them to the state treasury. Empowering local managers is critical 
to retain the user fees for sustainable improvement of quality of services.  
What next 
Performance-based incentive mechanism is an innovative strategy to tackle issues related to service 
use and provider performance. It is a transitional mechanism to expedite health results. In 
Bangladesh, the need for continuing performance-based financing programs to meet MDGs and 
other health indicators is beyond argument. Specifically, such encouragement is required until certain 
level of institutional deliveries and improvement in maternal and child health are reached. It is 
urgently required to decide in what capacity performance-based financing program should continue.   
Whatever the approach may be, the necessity of “quality of care” approach to improve maternal, 
newborn and child health services tested under the P4P scheme cannot be denied for the 
improvement of the monitoring of health service delivery in Bangladesh. Particularly, P4P’s quality 
assurance approach may have implications to enrich the DSF scheme for performing better. It will 
be more useful and feasible if policymakers and program managers adopt results from both DSF 
and P4P and advance with a revised model, which will require less money and be more effective in 




ANNEXURE   
Program of the workshop 
 
National Workshop on 
Innovative Financing through Pay-for-Performance for Providers to  
Improve Quality of Care in Bangladesh: Transforming Research into Action  
12-13 December 2011, Lake Shore Hotel, Dhaka 
12 December 2011 (Monday) 
Chief Guest: Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Secretary, MOHFW 
Chair: Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS 
9:30 am - 10:00 am Registration with Morning Refreshments 
10:00 am - 10:10 am 
 
Welcome Speech and Purpose of the Workshop 
Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS 
10:10 am - 10:30 am Performance Based Financing– Theory and Examples on International Experiences 
Dr. Ubaidur Rob, Country Director, Population Council  
10:30 am - 10:50 am Health Care Financing Strategy Process in Bangladesh 
Mr. Prasanta Bhushan Barua, Joint Chief, HEU, MOHFW 
10:50 am - 11:10 am DSF Scheme: Design, Experiences, Challenges and Way Forward  
Dr. Azizul Alim, DGHS, MOHFW 
11:10 am - 11:50 am P4P Model: Context, Design, Experiences, Challenges and Way Forward 
Dr. Riad Mahmud, UNICEF and Laila Rahman, Population Council 
11:50 am - 12:20 pm 
 
Testimonies of the Implementers:  
P4P Committees, Quality Assurance Groups,  
Quality Assurance Teams and Institutional Beneficiaries 
12:20 pm - 1:00 pm Open Discussion 
1:00 pm - 1:10 pm Speech by the Special Guest 
Dr. Mohammed Sharif, Line Director, MCH, DGFP 
1:10 pm - 1:20 pm Speech by the Special Guest 
Mr. Michel Saint-Lot, Deputy Representative, UNICEF 
1:20 pm - 1:30 pm Remarks by the Chair  
Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS 
1:30 pm Lunch Follows  
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Program (Continued)  
 
National Workshop on 
Innovative Financing through Pay-for-Performance for Providers to  
Improve Quality of Care in Bangladesh: Transforming Research into Action  
12-13 December 2011, Lake Shore Hotel, Dhaka 
13 December 2011 (Tuesday) 
Chief Guest: Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Secretary, MOHFW 
Chair: Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director,  Primary Health Care, DGHS 
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financing mechanism in the DSF scheme 
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   11:45 am - 12:00 pm 
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Mr. Md. Humayun Kabir, Secretary, MOHFW 
1:15 pm - 1:25 pm Closing Remarks by the Chair 
Dr. Md. Shamsul Haque, Director, Primary Health Care, DGHS 
1:25 pm - 1:30 pm 
 
Vote of Thanks  
Dr. Md Sayedur Rahman, Program Manager, RH, DGHS 
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'Reward health workers to encourage them'  
 Staff Correspondent  
 
 
Introduction of reward for performance would encourage health workers to carry out their responsibilities 
properly, speakers said at a workshop on Monday.  
 
Besides, the government should ensure punishment of those employees of health and family planning 
departments who do not perform their duties properly and are absent from workplaces, they said.  
 
The Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), Population Council and Unicef jointly orgainsed the 
workshop titled 'Innovating financing through pay-for-performance for providers to improve quality of care 
in Bangladesh: Transforming research into action' at Lakeshore Hotel in the city.  
 
While addressing the programme, Population Council's Country Director Dr Obaidur Rob said the country 
would face more challenges of providing health care services to people in near future if the present 
population growth rate is not considered. Every year two million people are being added to the population, 
he said, adding that more health care resources will be needed for this additional people. He urged the 
health workers to motivate people living in remote areas to keep their family size small. 
 
Prasanta Bhushan Barua, joint chief of Health Economics unit under the Health and Family Welfare 
Ministry, said poor people are still not getting adequate health care services across the country due to 
poverty. Free health care services needs to be introduced across the country for the poor, he said. 
 
Dr Shamsul Haque, director of Primary Health Care of DGHS, said introduction of performance based 
reward for health workers in Gaibandha, Jamalpur and Kurigram is producing positive results. He said the 
reward programme needs to be extended to Char, costal and hilly areas to make health care services 
available to the poor people.  
 
Former adviser to caretaker government DK Nath, Barkat-e-Khuda, professor of Economics Department 
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পারফরময্াn- িভিtক pেণাদনা pদান েদেশর sাsয্েসবায় নতুন aধয্ায় সৃিɽ করেব।  টােগর্ট anযায়ী েসবা pদান করেল 
হাসপাতাল েথেক েসবা gহেণর হার uেlখেযাগয্ভােব বৃিd পােব, েসiসেঙ্গ েসবার gণগত মানo বৃিd পােব। eেত েসবা 
pদানকারী eবং েসবা gহণকারী uভেয়i uপকৃত হেব। 
 
গতকাল রাজধানীর eকিট েহােটেল  েপ ফর পারফরময্াn িবষয়ক d িদনবয্াপী eক কমর্শালার uেdাধনী েসশেন sাsয্ 
িবেশষjরা eসব কথা বেলন। কমর্শালায় িবেশষjরা জানান, rয়ান্ডা, িবিলজ, েকিনয়া, হাiিত, কেmািডয়া, 
আফগািনsানসহ পৃিথবীর aেনক েদেশi েপ ফর পারফরময্াn pচিলত আেছ। েদেশ ei েপ ফর পারফরময্াn কাযর্kম 
খুবi নতুন। পপেুলশন কাuিnল পাiলট পযর্ােয় sাsয্ aিধদফতরেক গাiবাnা, kিড়gাম o জামালপুর েজলায় 
পরীkামূলক েপ ফর পারফরময্াn কাযর্kম বাsবায়েন কািরগির সহায়তা pদান করেছ। 
 
sাsয্ aিধদফতর eবং পপুেলশন কাuিnেলর েযৗথ uেদয্ােগ আেয়ািজত e কমর্শালায় সভাপিতt কেরন pাiমাির েহলথ 
েকয়ােরর পিরচালক ডা. েমা. শামsল হক।  েপ ফর পারফরময্াn িবষয়ক আnজর্ািতক aিভjতাgেলা তুেল ধেরন 
পপুেলশন কাuিnেলর কািন্T িডেরkর ড. oবায়dর রব। কাuিnেলর িসিনয়র েpাgাম aিফসার লায়লা রহমান বাংলােদেশ 
েপ ফর পারফরময্ােnর পাiলট pেজেkর বাsবায়ন, ফলাফল eবং aিজর্ত aিভjতার oপর eকিট তথয্পূণর্ pিতেবদন 
uপsাপন কেরন। uেdাধনী anɾােন anেদর মেধয্ বkবয্ রােখন পিরবার পিরকlনা aিধদফতেরর eমিসeiেচর লাiন 
িডেরkর ডা. েমাহাmদ শরীফ eবং iuিনেসেফর েডপুিট িরেpেজেন্টিটভ িমেশল েসiন্ট- লট, তttাবধায়ক সরকােরর 
সােবক uপেদɽা ধীরাজ kমার নাথ, sাsয্ মntণালেয়র েহলথ iেকানিমk iuিনেটর যুg pধান pশাn ভূষণ বড়ুয়া, sাsয্ 
aিধদফতেরর ডা. আিজজুল আলীম, iuিনেসেফর ড. িরয়াদ মাহমুদ eবং পপুেলশন কাuিnেলর aয্াডভাiজার eেকeম 
জাফর ulাহ খান। 
 
anɾােন জানােনা হয়  েপ ফর পারফরময্াn হেলা েসবা pদানকারী pিতɾান eবং েসবাpদানকারীেক আিথর্ক sিবধা 
pদােনর মাধয্েম কমর্দkতা eবং কমর্সmাদেনর হার বৃিdেত uত্সাহ েদয়া। েপ ফর পারফরময্াn মেডেল pিতɾানেক 
pেণাদনা pদােনর মাধয্েম তােদর পারফরময্াn বৃিdর pয়াস থাকায় েসবা gহীতাo মানসmn েসবা েপেয় থােকন। িবেশষ 
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